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Between Autonomy and Interdependence: the Challenges of Shared Rule after the Scottish 
Referendum 
 
Nicola McEwen and Bettina Petersohn 
 
Abstract. Drawing on the distinction between self-rule and shared rule in multi-level states, 
this article argues that shared rule has been the neglected element of the UK devolution 
settlement. The ability of the devolved administrations to participate in, and influence, 
national decision making through shared rule mechanisms is very limited. The article argues 
that the lack of shared rule is especially problematic in light of the increasing complexity of 
the Scottish devolution settlement in the wake of the Scotland Act 2012 and the Smith 
commission report. Smith, in particular, seems set to increase both the power of the Scottish 
Parliament and its dependence on UK policy decisions in the areas of tax, welfare and the 
economy. Creating a more robust intergovernmental system which could manage these new 
interdependencies will be a significant challenge, and yet, without such a system, the new 
settlement will be difficult to sustain. 
Keywords: shared rule, self rule, devolution, Smith commission, Scotland, interdependence      
 
The Scottish constitutional debate, both before and after devolution, has been heavily centred 
on ‘self-rule’ and the politics of self-government. For many within the broad home rule 
movement, the goal was to maximise the capacity of the Scottish parliament and government 
to make policy decisions autonomously. The Scottish parliament enjoys a relatively high 
degree of self-rule, at least on a par with regions in many federal states. The revisions to the 
devolution settlement enshrined in the Scotland Act 2012 and those being developed in the 
aftermath of the 2014 independence referendum will increase Scottish self-rule within the 
United Kingdom still further.  
 
This focus on self-rule has left the second aspect of power allocation – shared rule – largely 
neglected. Shared rule refers to the participation of sub-state nations or regions in decision-
making processes at the centre. Shared rule can be formally institutionalised by giving sub-
state nations or regions a meaningful presence and influence in national parliaments, or 
through intergovernmental forums which allow sub-state governments to participate in or co-
decide national policies. A machinery of intergovernmental relations has evolved in the UK, 
but it is weakly institutionalised and dependent upon good communication, goodwill and 
mutual trust. The opportunities for participation and influence over the decision-making 
processes of central government remain weak.  
 
Yet, the weakness of shared rule is especially problematic in view of the new constitutional 
settlement embodied in the Scotland Act 2012, and that expected to be legislated in the wake 
of the Smith Commission’s Heads of Agreement. The former introduces an obligation on the 
parliament to raise a proportion of income tax, while the latter promises that all income tax 
paid by Scottish residents will be raised by the Scottish parliament, with the scope to 
determine the rates and thresholds at which most income tax will be paid. The Smith 
commission also recommended an increase in the powers of the Scottish parliament in a 
range of other areas, most notably social security. But it also increases significantly the 
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interdependence between devolved and reserved powers. Income tax rates and thresholds 
may be devolved, but every other aspect of income tax, like the definition of taxable income, 
the personal allowance or rules governing tax credit, exemptions and avoidance, will remain 
reserved. Some benefits for the elderly and people with disabilities are set to be devolved, but 
these will interact with and be shaped by the rest of the social security and tax credit system 
which stays reserved. While once the devolution settlement might have been characterized as 
a dual system, with a relatively clear separation of reserved and devolved competences, the 
new emerging system is more complex. It simultaneously increases Scottish autonomy while 
increasing the devolved institutions’ dependence on central government decisions in related 
policy fields which remain reserved. The draft clauses published in January also revealed the 
extent to which some of the new devolved competences will require the cooperation and 
consent of the UK Government before meaningful policy decisions can be implemented. 
 
This article questions whether the architecture of devolution and the mechanisms for 
managing the interface between devolved and reserved powers are capable of managing such 
interdependence. This question is addressed in three sections. We first set out in more detail 
the distinction between self-rule and shared rule and their relationship to the structural 
allocation of power in federal and regionalised political systems. We then examine the 
limited shared rule mechanisms built into the architecture of UK devolution. In the third 
section, we argue that these mechanisms are inadequate to manage the more complex 
devolution settlement emerging in the wake of the Scottish independence referendum. 
 
Self-Rule, Shared Rule and Power allocation in Multi-level States 
 
All multi-level systems combine elements of self-rule and shared rule. Self-rule refers to the 
extent to which regional governments are independent of central government, for example, in 
their scope for policy-making, legislation and revenue-raising. Shared rule, by contrast, refers 
to the capacity of a regional government to influence central decision making. We focus here 
on shared rule. 
 
In their Regional Authority Index, Hooghe et al identified four dimensions of shared rule.i 
The first is the extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation. 
This usually takes place within a second chamber, where regional governments can be 
directly represented, as in the German Bundesrat, or where regions are the basis of 
representation, as in the US Senate, with variable degrees of influence in both cases. The 
second dimension of shared rule is the extent to which regional governments share executive 
authority with central government within intergovernmental meetings. Shared rule is stronger 
when intergovernmental meetings are routinized rather than ad hoc, and when they reach 
decisions which are binding on both tiers of government. The third dimension refers to the 
extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax 
revenues in intergovernmental forums or in legislatures with regional representation, 
negotiating and sometimes with veto power over the distribution of tax revenues, including 
intergovernmental grants. The final dimension is whether regional representatives, or regional 
electorates, can co-determine reforms to the constitution, especially with respect to the 
distribution of powers between central and regional governments. Shared rule is higher where 
regional governments can postpone constitutional proposals, amend constitutional legislation, 
3 
 
or influence the decision-making process in other ways, potentially through vetoing change, 
or where change would require popular consent in a regional referendum. 
 
The degree of self-rule and shared rule in a multi-level system is influenced by the way in 
which powers are allocated to different levels of government. A dual allocation of power 
gives each level a high degree of self-rule. Assigning exclusive jurisdiction and competences 
over the legislative and implementation processes to each level of government minimises the 
necessity for coordination and co-decision while leaving greater opportunities for unilateral 
decisions. Canada is the archetype, where there are high levels of provincial autonomy and 
both federal and provincial governments have traditionally enjoyed clearly demarcated 
spheres of jurisdiction in most policy spheres. Extensive coordination and cooperation 
(vertical and horizontal) takes place but it is weakly institutionalised. Where federal-
provincial coordination agreements are reached in areas of provincial jurisdiction, provinces 
can have the (often contested) possibility of opting-out. The development of the post-war 
welfare state saw greater co-ordination and harmonisation, though the province of Quebec 
stood apart, first as a result of the detachment of a conservative regime then, later, in the 
desire of a progressive liberal regime to be ‘maîtres chez nous’, including through negotiated 
opt-outs (with fiscal compensation) of a raft of federal-provincial social programmes to 
permit the development of a distinctive welfare regime. In the area of income tax there 
remain separate federal and provincial tax powers, but most provinces have harmonised some 
policies and share administration of taxes through Revenue Canada. Quebec is again the 
exception, with more distinctive tax policies and a separate body, Revenue Quebec, which 
collects federal and provincial taxes for Quebec residents.
ii
 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are those multi-level systems where the powers and 
responsibilities of both levels of government are interlocked, often with central institutions 
having legislative power over the majority of policies while the lower level is responsible for 
execution and administration. Such systems have built-in incentives for a high degree of 
shared rule to co-ordinate and co-decide legislation and policy-making. The German system 
is the classic example of interdependent, if not interlocked, levels of government. As a result 
of the functional allocation of power but also the particular composition of the Bundesrat, 
joint decision-making and intergovernmental relations between the levels are highly 
institutionalised. Co-ordination predominantly takes place between the Länder 
administrations and the federal level. Länder governments also coordinate positions 
horizontally, beginning with voluntary coordination in the area of education and culture to 
more institutionalised inter-ministerial meetings which have decision-making powers over a 
broad range of policy areas, including justice, home affairs and finance. Due to a political 
culture which favours consensual decision-making, harmonisation, and comparable levels of 
living conditions, Länder governments even coordinate when they have the power to pursue 
distinctive policies.iii In education, for example, coordination began with the harmonisation of 
school years, start/end dates and holidays, and expanded to teacher training and education 
standards for subjects and school levels. Although broadcasting is a Land responsibility, the 
interstate treaty on broadcasting between all Länder defines uniform, national regulations 
including the fees to be paid by households. 
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Dual and interlocked systems are at two ends of a spectrum of power allocation, but there are 
a variety of forms of multi-level power allocation in between. As depicted in Figure 1, the 
way in which powers are allocated is associated with the degree of autonomy, co-operation 
and co-decision between each level. In general, those systems which lean more towards self-
rule with a dual allocation of power require less cooperation and co-decision between central 
and regional governments, while those which are more interlocked have higher levels of 
shared rule with more structural opportunities for regional governments or representatives to 
shape those national decisions which affect their powers and responsibilities. Between the 
two poles are varieties of informal and formal co-operation involving central and regional 
governments bilaterally or multilateral cooperation among all regional governments with, or 
without, central government involvement.  
 
Figure 1: Power Allocation and Models of Intergovernmental Co-operation in Multi-level 
Statesiv 
  
 
The archetypal cases discussed above are classic federal states. More recently regionalised or 
federalised states have mostly leaned more towards self-rule, separating powers between 
levels of government and often distributing power asymmetrically, with distinctive regions or 
sub-state nations enjoying varying levels of autonomy and exercising jurisdiction over 
different policy areas. Even here, however, there is a need to cooperate. A complete 
separation of powers is neither possible nor reflective of the interconnectedness of modern 
policy challenges. Spill-over effects, when decisions at one level have consequences for the 
other, are commonplace, especially where central and sub-state policy jurisdictions are 
clearly interconnected (social security and social policy, or energy regulation and energy 
efficiency, for example). Some policy problems – climate change or security - defy the 
constitutional allocation of powers and necessitate cooperation within and between states. 
The process of Europeanisation provides further incentive for intergovernmental cooperation 
when EU competence overlaps with sub-state competence (as is often the case), and member 
states are represented in the European Council by the national government (as is almost 
always the case).  
 
The extent to which these interdependences are accompanied by institutionalised mechanisms 
for joint decision-making varies. Federalisation in Belgium has followed the principle of 
separate and exclusive powers for the three institutional levels (federal, regional and 
linguistic community) but a machinery of intergovernmental relations, including compulsory 
agreements in areas like transport or waterworks as well as voluntary information sharing, 
has been established alongside decentralisation to manage policy interdependencies. Recent 
reforms to enhance the fiscal autonomy of the Belgian regions were accompanied by 
intergovernmental agreement to avoid unfair tax competition, achieve fiscal consolidation 
and maintain the progressive character of income tax. In Spain, Autonomous Communities 
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(ACs) have a significant degree of self-rule, but it is sometimes circumscribed by the power 
of central government to design framework legislation, for example, in health or education, 
setting parameters within which the ACs can act. An extensive series of inter-ministerial 
sectoral conferences has developed to manage policy interdependencies across a range of 
policy fields. Not all of them meet frequently; the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy and 
the Conference on Issues Related to the European Communities are amongst the most 
prominent. Moreover, as vertical intergovernmental bodies in which the central government 
plays the dominant role, they provide only a modest degree of shared rule.
v
  
 
As will be set out below, the way in which powers were allocated in the UK in the 1998 
devolution settlement leaned more towards self-rule rather than shared rule (at least for 
Scotland) but recent changes suggest that new powers will increase the interdependence 
between the two governmental and legislative tiers. Informal processes of intergovernmental 
cooperation have developed to manage interdependence, alongside a fairly weak machinery 
of intergovernmental relations. These are arguably insufficient to manage the new 
interdependencies that the ongoing constitutional changes seem set to generate.   
 
 
II Devolution and the Weakness of Shared Rule in the UK 
 
The Scotland Act 1998 implied a significant increase in the degree of ‘self-rule’ enjoyed by 
Scotland within the United Kingdom. Although in strictly legal terms, the devolution 
settlement did not diminish the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament, in practice, it gave 
significant decision-making autonomy to the Scottish parliament and government, on a par 
with many sub-state units in federal states. Moreover, it has become an established principle 
that the Westminster parliament will now not legislate in devolved spheres without the prior 
consent of the Scottish parliament. The one area where the devolution settlement involved a 
comparative lack of self-rule vis-à-vis regions in federal states was in the level of fiscal 
autonomy. By contrast, the Scottish Government has enjoyed a degree of autonomy over its 
spending decisions exceeding that found in many other multi-level states where spending is 
sometimes limited to designated policy areas or transfers are made conditional upon meeting 
minimum national standards, for example, for the provision of health care services. 
 
The high degree of self-rule stands in stark contrast to the weakness of formal shared rule.
vi
 
This in part reflects the model of devolution introduced in 1999, which conformed most 
closely to a dual allocation of power, with a clear distinction between powers reserved to the 
Westminster parliament, powers devolved to the Scottish parliament (all those powers not 
explicitly reserved in the Scotland Act 1998), and very few areas of concurrent jurisdiction, 
reducing the structural incentives for cooperation.  
 
The low level of shared rule is evident when assessed in light of the dimensions set out by 
Hooghe et al in their regional authority index. With respect to the first dimension, law 
making, the level of shared rule in Scotland is virtually absent. In Westminster, reform of the 
House of Lords to incorporate territorial representation remains a federalist’s pipe dream, and 
there is no Scotland-wide territorial representation in the House of Commons. MPs are 
elected to represent constituencies and parties, not regions or nations. Scotland-focused 
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procedures remain in the chamber and the Scottish Affairs committee, but their status – never 
high – has diminished since devolution. The prospect of ‘English votes for English laws’ 
(EVEL), the implementation of which would see reduced voting rights for Scottish MPs, may 
accentuate the lack of parliamentary shared rule (see Charlie Jeffery in this issue). It will 
territorially demarcate Scottish MPs as a distinctive group while simultaneously weakening 
their influence over the legislative process. ‘EVEL’ also runs counter to classic federal 
models in which territorial representation is channelled through the upper house while equal 
representation of the population and party affiliation dominate the lower house.  
 
The only formal representation of Scotland as a territorial entity at the UK level is the 
Scotland Office. Although its status diminished after devolution, it has regained some 
authority and influence following the emergence of party political incongruence in the 
composition of the Scottish and UK governments after the 2007 election. As well as bringing 
party competition to the intergovernmental arena, this period heralded revisions to the 
devolution settlement, giving the Scotland Office a key role in steering new devolution 
legislation through the legislative and implementation process.vii However, its dual role of 
advancing Scotland’s interests in the UK government and advancing the UK government’s 
interests in Scotland has, at times, appeared to tilt towards the latter, weakening its capacity 
to act as a voice for Scotland in national decision-making.  
 
The preference of the Scottish Government has been to maximise its self-rule, but, where 
representation at the centre is necessary, it has sought influence through inter-executive 
relations (Hooghe et al’s second dimension of shared rule). The Scottish Government has 
tried to nurture bilateral engagement directly with UK departments rather than to use the 
Scotland Office as a gateway to Whitehall. Intergovernmental relations featured little in the 
preparations for devolution, but developing ‘working connections’ between officials and 
ministers was always going to be necessary. Devolution will always impose limits on the 
policy and legislative autonomy of the Scottish government and parliament, and the boundary 
between devolved and reserved powers needs to be managed. As Agranoff observed, ‘self-
rule can be formally introduced to a polity’s governing arrangements but cannot be 
maintained without the working connections that tie central governments to those constituent 
units that enjoy measures of independent and interdependent political power, governmental 
control, and decision-making’.
viii
 
  
By design, IGR in the UK is mainly informal, underpinned by good communication, goodwill 
and mutual trust. The Memorandum of Understanding, the concordats between the Scottish 
Government and Whitehall departments, and the Devolution Guidance Notes were intended 
to embody and nurture a co-operative working culture among civil servants on a day-to-day 
basis. Although the MoU provided for a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) to bring together 
all of the devolved administrations with the UK government, it met only a few times in 
plenary and functional formats before becoming largely redundant in 2002. The exception 
was the JMC (Europe) where there was a clear and continuing need to bring the devolved 
administrations together with the UK government before European Council meetings. Under 
the radar, however, ministers and officials coordinated in other forums and, during the era of 
predominant party political congruence, any potentially contentious intergovernmental issues 
could be headed off by a phone call between party colleagues.
ix
 These relationships, though 
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informal, were broadly cooperative. The Joint Ministerial Committee was only resurrected 
after the emergence of party political incongruence in the composition of governments north 
and south of the border after 2007. It now meets annually in plenary format and when 
required (usually annually) in its domestic format, while meetings of the JMC (Europe) 
continue to conform to the timetable of European Council meetings. The JMC remains the tip 
of the iceberg of intergovernmental relations. Most intergovernmental exchange continues to 
take place below the radar, between officials of varying ranks working in similar or 
overlapping policy issues on a (vertical and horizontal) bilateral basis.  
 
Yet, intergovernmental relations remain, at best, a weak form of shared rule, which provides 
only limited opportunities to participate in UK decision-making. Despite the devolved 
administrations sometimes using the JMC to air common grievances, UK intergovernmental 
relations are hierarchical and dominated by the UK government. The JMC is not an executive 
body – its role is to provide a forum for communication and shared learning, not decision-
making. Good communication and cooperation was meant to avoid the emergence of 
disputes, and to resolve them if necessary. In 2010, a formal dispute resolution mechanism 
was introduced within the JMC, and invoked by the devolved administrations to address a 
particular financial grievance they shared. However, the opportunities for influence remain 
limited by the in-built hierarchical position of the UK government, the more frequent lack of 
common cause among the devolved governments, and the limited opportunities for one 
administration acting alone to use this forum to advance its own interests. The Scottish 
government’s preference has been to lobby Whitehall directly by using ‘soft powers’, or 
powers of persuasion. This can secure influence in areas where Scotland has particular and 
recognised resource strength, policy expertise and demonstrable leadership. For example, its 
marine resource strength has enhanced the Scottish Government’s influence in contributing to 
the UK government’s approach to the EU Common Fisheries Policy, while in the area of 
renewable energy, where Scotland is regarded as a front-runner, intergovernmental 
cooperation has secured some concessions in UK Electricity Market Reform, for example 
over the negotiation a separate ‘strike price’ for the Scottish islands. Political and electoral 
strength can also lend popular legitimacy to intergovernmental demands and boost the 
capacity to influence outcomes. A prime example was when, after the SNP secured a 
parliamentary majority in the 2011 election, the Scottish and UK Governments negotiated an 
agreement to transfer legal competence to the Scottish Parliament to enable it to legislate for 
the independence referendum. In other policy areas or other political contexts, the 
opportunities for exercising influence through these bilateral informal channels are more 
limited. 
 
There is even less evidence of Hooghe et al’s third dimension of shared rule, the ability to co-
determine the distribution of national tax revenues. The Scottish government has no 
opportunity to influence how national taxes are distributed, and to date has had little revenue-
raising capacity of its own. The vast majority of the Scottish government’s budget takes the 
form of a fiscal transfer – the block grant – the level of which is determined by the Barnett 
formula (see David Bell in this issue). This, in turn, is dependent on the expenditure decisions 
of the UK government over which the Scottish Government has no control, though Scottish 
parliamentarians can at least speak to these decisions (at least until EVEL is introduced). 
Devolution thus created a considerable vertical fiscal imbalance; power and responsibility for 
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spending have not been matched by the power and responsibility to raise revenue. Such an 
imbalance, not uncommon in multi-level systems, often generates contentious 
intergovernmental disputes. Although the maintenance of a formula-driven budget settlement 
has prevented frequent disputes, intergovernmental issues have emerged over discretionary 
spending and especially in light of the broader context of fiscal austerity and budgetary 
restraint. 
  
Thus, on the first three dimensions, the Scottish devolution settlement provides very little 
scope for shared rule. There is, however, an informal but significant degree of shared rule 
with respect to the final dimension, constitutional reform. The constitution is a reserved 
matter and so falls firmly within the legal jurisdiction of the UK parliament, but, by 
convention, the Scottish Parliament’s consent to any changes to the Scottish devolution 
settlement must be secured. A precedent was set with the Scotland Act 2012. The Scottish 
Parliament passed a legislative consent motion supporting the general principles of the 
Scotland bill at the start of its legislative journey, but with recommendations for improvement 
and the withholding of final consent until legislative amendments were examined and some 
modest intergovernmental concessions secured. Although there was no legal impediment to it 
doing so, the UK government had indicated that the legislation would not be passed without 
the consent of the Scottish Parliament, suggesting that the Scottish Parliament would have 
been able to exercise a veto. Such an outcome has yet to be tested.  
 
 
III Devolution and interdependence in post-referendum Scotland 
 
The election of the Scottish National Party to government in 2007 kick-started an intense 
constitutional debate and reform to the original devolution settlement. Following the 
recommendations of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act 2012 heralded a significant 
increase in the powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, with a particular focus 
on financial accountability and revenue-raising. The Smith Commission, established in the 
immediate aftermath of the referendum, recommended further powers and responsibilities for 
the parliament in taxation, welfare, and a variety of other policy areas and programmes before 
the main provisions of the Scotland Act 2012 have even been introduced. If its proposals 
become law, they will reinforce a tendency already evident in the Scotland Act 2012 – an 
increase in the powers of the parliament alongside a simultaneous increase in its dependence 
on Westminster.  
 
The Scotland Act 2012, and the Smith proposals once implemented, will increase the self-rule 
of the Scottish Parliament, especially with respect to revenue-raising. Whereas the former 
provided for a modest increase in tax autonomy, the latter goes further with a 
recommendation for the devolution of 100% tax on earned income, including almost all rates 
and thresholds, as well as the devolution of air passenger duty and the aggregates levy, and an 
assigned share of VAT revenues. The proposals also create new interdependencies in tax 
policy. The Smith report insists that income tax will remain a ‘shared tax’, under the shared 
control of the UK and Scottish parliaments. In practice, the Scottish government will 
determine tax rates and thresholds for Scottish taxpayers; the UK government will remain 
responsible for all other areas of income tax, including the personal allowance, taxes on 
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savings, tax credits and the framework for determining the rules underpinning income tax 
policy, including definition of taxpayers and rules on tax avoidance and tax relief. The UK 
government will thus determine the framework within which the new Scottish powers will be 
exercised, and its policies will have a direct impact on those aspects of income tax policy 
which are to become the responsibility of the Scottish government and parliament. The two 
governments will also share a bureaucracy - Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
will continue to collect and administer Scottish income tax as well as income tax from the 
rest of the UK.  
 
The recommendations of the Smith Commission also create new interdependencies in other 
policy spheres, most notably social security. Its recommendations would bring around 14% of 
social security spend under the control of the Scottish Parliament, including Disability Living 
Allowance/Personal Independence Payments, Attendance Allowance, and Carer’s Allowance. 
These benefits interact with many other benefits, tax credits and tax/VAT exemptions, all of 
which remain reserved to the UK government. The Smith report also recommended that the 
Scottish government be permitted flexibility in the administration of the Universal Credit 
(UC), the centrepiece of the UK government’s welfare reforms. In addition, the Scottish 
Parliament is to have the power (thus far ill-defined) to ‘vary’ the housing cost elements of 
UC, including ‘varying’ the under-occupancy charge and local housing allowance rates, 
eligible rent and deductions for non-payment. These housing elements are not only closely 
related to other areas of the Universal Credit, but also to other aspects of housing policy 
which remain reserved, include housing taxes and tax relief, and policies which shape both 
the mortgage market and the capacity for the Scottish government to borrow to invest in 
social housing. The Scottish government is to assume responsibility for at least some 
employment support programmes for the unemployed, but it will have no formal role in Job 
Centre Plus, which provides the frontline service to jobseekers, nor to the development or 
oversight of rules making benefit entitlement conditional upon take-up and completion of 
employment support schemes. Decisions taken by UK ministers will affect, in fundamental 
ways, the new areas of devolved responsibility in social security. These interdependencies 
will create more spill-over effects, ensuring that the decisions taken by one level of 
government will have repercussions for the other.  
 
The emerging devolution settlement is thus more complex and interdependent than that set 
out in the Scotland Act 1998. The attempt to incorporate these new provisions in a draft 
Scotland Bill revealed both the gradual departure from the ‘reserved powers’ model and the 
emerging institutional interdependence; 12 of the new clauses include specific requirements 
for intergovernmental consultation, eight of which require the explicit consent of the relevant 
Secretary of State before devolution decisions can be implemented. The Smith Commission 
recognised this increased complexity in its call for the reform” and “scaling up” of 
intergovernmental machinery “as a matter of urgency”, including new bilateral arrangements, 
and a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee in December kick-started a re-evaluation 
within the Cabinet Office of the existing intergovernmental arrangements. Some new bilateral 
intergovernmental forums have already emerged, outside of the formal JMC framework. The 
Joint Exchequer Committee, composed of three UK ministers (the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, the Exchequer Secretary, and the Secretary of State for Scotland) and two Scottish 
Government ministers (the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Sustainable 
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Growth and the Cabinet Secretary for Parliamentary Business and Government Strategy) has 
been meeting since September 2011 as a forum for high level discussions on the 
implementation of the financial provisions of the Scotland Act 2012. At operational level, a 
Scotland Act 2012 implementation programme board, including representatives from HMRC, 
HM Treasury, the Scotland Office and the Scottish government, has been overseeing the 
delivery work carried out by HMRC with respect to the implementation of the Scottish rate of 
income tax as well as the devolution and, hence, the disapplication of Stamp Duty Land Tax 
and Landfill Tax in Scotland. However, the focus of these forums, to date, has been on 
implementing new powers. We can expect them, and similar intergovernmental forums in 
social security, to extend their work to incorporate implementation of the Smith powers. It is 
not at all certain that they will have a permanent role in managing policy interdependence or 
in providing an avenue for Scottish influence over those areas of reserved policy which will 
directly impact upon Scottish competences.  
 
Yet, if the new interdependent devolution settlement is to be sustainable, and if it is to avoid 
the emergence of tensions, manage policy overspill and maintain effective communication, it 
may require more robust mechanisms of shared rule more akin to those found in federal 
systems.  Given the weakness of the other indicators of shared rule highlighted above, this is 
most feasible within the intergovernmental arena. Revising intergovernmental relations 
doesn’t require new legislation, but it would require a cultural change in the relationship 
between the UK and Scottish Governments. Existing multi-lateral IGR forums like the JMC 
would be inappropriate for managing those areas that would predominantly pose an 
intergovernmental challenge for only the UK Government and the Scottish Government. 
Existing bilateral procedures, where the two governments interact at the level of officials and 
ministers as and when necessary, or as and when the opportunity arises, seem similarly 
inadequate to meet the new challenges of an interdependent devolution settlement. Informal 
communications and interpersonal trust will always be necessary, but they are insufficient. 
They offer no guarantees that the Scottish government would be able to gain access to key 
UK policy makers operating in shared policy space, or have influence over those UK policies 
which will inevitably shape and constrain Scottish policy autonomy, and alter the social and 
economic context in which devolved policy choices must be made.  
 
Yet, the asymmetry of the UK state, the lack of a federal mind-set, the enduring commitment 
to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the desire for both governments (at least 
currently) to maximise their respective decision-making autonomy, combine to make 
managing a more interdependent system difficult. Devising more effective bilateral 
intergovernmental processes and forums is possible. However, the prospect of such forums 
leading to the Scottish and UK governments genuinely sharing executive authority and 
making decisions which would be mutually binding (Hooghe et al’s second indicator of 
shared rule) seems unlikely. Such a degree of influence for the Scottish government would be 
unlikely to secure legitimacy across the UK, nor curry favour in Westminster and Whitehall. 
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